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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
INCONTESTABLE CLAUSES IN GROUP LIFE
INSURANCE POLICIES-PRECLUDED DEFENSES
In Simpson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co.,1 a New York court
held that an incontestable clause2 in a group life insurance policy
precludes the insurer from contesting liability by showing the in-
sured was not covered by the policy. The reasons supporting the
decision were not made clear. The court either chose not to follow
the distinction followed by most jurisdictions between the effect of
an incontestable clause on defenses of no coverage and defenses of
invalidity; or, it considered other criteria for this distinction not
recognized by the majority of jurisdictions.
This Note will analyze the different views concerning defenses
barred by an incontestable clause and the distinction drawn be-
tween defenses of coverage and defenses of invalidity. A sugges-
tion will then be offered to arrive at a concept of the effect of an
incontestable clause acceptable to both individual and group life
insurance policies.
Simpson was an action to recover benefits brought by the
beneficiary of a group life insurance policy issued to her late hus-
band. The policy contained a provision defining employees who
qualified for the insurance. Decedent was at no time qualified
under this definition. The policy also contained an incontestable
clause8 in accordance with section 161 of the Insurance Law of New
York.4 The insurance company refused payment, arguing that
1. 291 N.Y.S.2d 532 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
2. After the death of the insured, it is often difficult for the surviv-
ing beneficiaries to produce competent testimony with which to defend
charges brought for the first time by the insurer. Insurance companies, in
an attempt to make their policies more attractive to the public, voluntarily
included in their policies clauses prohibiting contests after the lapse of a
specified time years before such clauses were required by statute. A few
insurance companies refused to follow this trend; thus statutory regulation
developed. Illinois, in 1907, was the first state to adopt such legislation,
and today almost all states require the presence of a prescribed incon-
testable clause in all life insurance policies.
The wisdom behind this requirement has never been challenged, but
the determination of what contests are barred by an incontestable clause is
still a source of controversy. See generally Cooper, Incontestable Life
Insurance, 19 ILL. L. REV. 226 (1924); 44 W. VA. L.Q. 390 (1938).
3. "INCONTESTIBILITY: The validity of this policy shall not be
contested, except for nonpayment of premiums, after it has been in force for
two years from the date of issue."
4. N.Y. INS. LAW § 161 (McKinney 1966). This section provides in
part, as follows:
1. No policy of group life insurance shall be delivered or issued for
delivery in this state unless it contains in substance the follow-
ing provisions or provisions which in the opinion of the super-
decedent was never covered by the policy; plaintiff contended that
this defense, arising more than two years after the issuance of the
policy, was barred by the incontestable clause.
In holding for the plaintiff, the majority held: (a) that it is
the legislative objective to obtain for policy holders the benefit of
an incontestable clause favorable to them; (b) that the incontest-
able clause required by the legislature to be inserted in group life
insurance policies is for the protection of individual certificate
holders; (c) that the distinction between the effect of an incon-
testable clause on defenses of no coverage and defenses of the
invalidity of the policy is not recognized in New York;5 and (d)
that this contest was not directed solely to coverage in that the
validity of the policy as to decedent was also being contested.
The grounds of the dissenting opinion were: (a) that the
decedent was never covered by the policy; (b) that the purpose of
an incontestable clause is not to extend the risk or coverage of a
policy; (c) that New York does recognize the distinction between
the effect of an incontestable clause on defenses of no coverage
and defenses directed toward the invalidity of the policy;6 and (d)
that this was solely a defense of no coverage.
ANALYSIS OF APPLICABLE DECISIONS
There are at present two views as to the inclusiveness of an
incontestable clause. The older view is that an insurer is barred
by an incontestable clause from raising any defense not specifically
intendent are more favorable to certificate holders, if any, or not
less favorable to certificate holders and more favorable to policy
holders.
(a) A provision that the policy shall be incontestable after
two years from its date of issue, except for nonpayment of
premiums by the policyholder and except for violation by
the person insured of the conditions of the policy relating to
military or naval service;
5. Eagon v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 2 App. Div. 2d 843, 156 N.Y.S.
2d 57 (1956), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 785, 143 N.E.2d 793, 164 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1957).
The insured was represented as a union member to the insurer under a
group life insurance policy which expressly limited coverage to union
members and also contained an incontestable clause. The beneficiary re-
covered on the policy even though the insured had not been a union
member.
6. Id. Where the decedent, a certificate holder of a group life in-
surance policy limited to union members, was not a union member, the
incontestable clause barred the insurer from arguing that the decedent
was never covered by the policy. The dissent felt that an incontestable
clause does not bar a defense that a certificate holder is not a risk covered
by the policy. Eagon was twice affirmed with no opinion. Since the dis-
sent in Eagon was never mentioned, the Simpson dissent reasoned that the
appellate courts affirmed the result only, leaving Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Conway, note 24 infra, as the controlling New York decision on
what defenses are barred by an incontestable clause. Simpson does little






The provision in a life insurance policy, making the con-
tract incontestable after a stated period, means something
more than that the insurer cannot then contest the validity
of the policy on the ground of breach of a condition; it
means that the company cannot then contest its obligation
to pay, on due proof of the death of the insured, the amount
stated on the face of the policy, except for a cause of de-
fense that is plainly excepted from the provision making
the policy incontestable.8
This view recognizes no distinction between a defense of invalid-
ity and a defense of no coverage. If an incontestable clause excepts
any defense, it is implied that no other defense is excluded from its
effect.9 All provisions and conditions may be contested before the
incontestable clause takes effect, and all plainly excepted defenses
may be contested at anytime.'0
Under this view the primary purpose of an incontestable clause
is to benefit the beneficiaries of insurance policies and thus any am-
biguity as to the applicability of the clause should be interpreted
in their favor." Another reason for this position is that an incon-
testable clause enhances the value of a policy after the incontest-
able period has run by removing all but specifically excepted con-
ditions. Policy holders are thereby encouraged to continue their
premium payments during the contestable period. To allow an
insurer to qualify this guarantee of the policy after the contestable
period would be unfair to the public. 12 Furthermore, the legis-
7. 1 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 331 (1965); 18
G. COUCH, INSURANCE 2d, § 72:59 (1968).
8. Bernier v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 173 La. 1078, 1080, 139 So.
629, 632 (1932).
9. Only those defenses which do not conflict with the statutory
form of the incontestable clause can be excepted from the incontestable
clause in an insurance policy. See, e.g., Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Sellkirk,
80 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1936); Foster v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 118 N.J.L.
228, 192 A. 59 (1937); Weston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 206 S.C. 139,
33 S.E.2d 386 (1945); Reserve Loan Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 159 S.W.2d
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
10. Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Barry, 213 Ind. App. 56, 10 N.E.2d 614
(1937); Leidenger v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 18 La. App. 348, 135 So. 85
(1931); O'Neil v. Union Life Ins. Co., 162 Neb. 284, 75 N.W.2d 739 (1956);
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cafiero, 126 N.J. Eq. 33, 7 A.2d 882 (1939).
11. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Austin, 142 F. 398 (1st Cir.
1905); Independent Life Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 222 Ala. 34, 130 So. 402 (1930);
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Margolis, 11 Cal. App. 2d 382, 53 P.2d 1017 (1936);
American Trust Co. v. Life Ins. Co., 173 N.C. 558, 92 S.E. 706 (1917).
12. Obartuch v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 114 F.2d 878 (7th Cir.
1940); Robison v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmens Ins. Dep't, Inc., 73 Ariz.
352, 241 P.2d 791 (1952), modified on other grounds, 74 Ariz. 44, 243 P.2d 472
(1952); Riley v. Industrial Life & Health Ins. Co., 190 Ga. 891, 11 S.E.2d 20
lature provided that all life insurance policies contain an incontest-
able clause to preclude insurers from contesting policies years after
premiums have been paid and after the insured has died and can
no longer defend his position. Certain defenses were excepted.
Had the legislature intended other exceptions, they too would have
been specifically excepted.13
Exceptions from this strict view must be taken when public
policy demands. For example, where a beneficiary murdered the
insured, the insurer was permitted to defend on the ground that
such a risk was not covered. Such exceptions have been justified
as a matter of public policy in only the gravest circumstances.
14
Thus, where the insured deliberately mutilated himself", or com-
mitted suicide, 6 the insurer was barred from defending on the
ground that such hazards were not covered.
Contract principles are as applicable to insurance contracts as
to any other contract.'7 To determine the true intent of contract-
ing parties, the whole contract of insurance should be considered. 8
But the effect of an incontestable clause seems to be determined
by the wording of that clause alone rather than by interpreting the
entire contract. Where the meaning of an insurance contract is
clear, it is no more subject to judicial change than any other con-
tract."" Nor is the application of adhesion contract principles 20 to
the interpretation of an incontestable clause commensurate with
the purpose behind these principles, since the presence and content
of an incontestable clause is required by statute. The statute
should be strictly construed in favor of the insurer since it is a
limitation on the general right to contract; any ambiguity as to its
(1940); Leidenger v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 18 La. App. 348, 135 So. 85
(1931); Allick v. Columbia Protective Ass'n, 269 App. Div. 281, 55 N.Y.S.2d
438 (1945).
13. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 254 U.S. 96 (1920);
Bernier v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 173 La. 1078, 139 So. 629 (1932);
Republic Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Smrha, 138 Neb. 484, 293 N.W. 372 (1940);
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Fishback, 171 Wash. 244, 17 P.2d 841 (1933).
14. E.g., Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Linson, 245 Ala. 493, 17 So. 2d 761
(1944); Moore v. American Ins. Union, 135 Kan. 311, 10 P.2d 1084 (1932);
Henderson v. Life Ins. Co., 176 S.C. 100, 179 S.E. 680 (1935).
15. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Kaufman, 78 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1935).
16. Longenberger v. Prudential Ins. Co., 121 Pa. Super. 225, 183 A. 422
(1936).
17. E.g., Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Daniels, 125 Colo. 451, 244 P.2d 1064
(1952); Werner v. State Life Ins. Co., 104 Ind. App. 27, 6 N.E.2d 786 (1937).
18. E.g., Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Kearney, 180 U.S. 132 (1901);
Reed v. Home State Life Ins. Co., 186 Okla. 226, 97 P.2d 53 (1939).
19. E.g., United States v. Patryas, 90 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1937); ajf'd,
303 U.S. 341 (1937); Gordon v. Unity Life Ins. Co., 215 La. 25, 39 So. 2d 812
(1949).
20. 1 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 1 (1965).
Any ambiguity in an insurance policy will be interpreted in favor
of the insured since an insurance contract is drafted solely by the
insurer, and the burden of any ambiguity in the contract should
be borne by the one who created that ambiguity.
Notes
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applicability should be resolved in favor of this right.21 If the
statute is construed to mean that defenses of coverage as well as
defenses of validity are barred, a legal anomaly results. The in-
surer's right to contract as to certain risks lasts only for the con-
testable period. After the incontestable clause becomes effective,
the policy will insure against all possible risks.
22
Most jurisdictions have decided that an incontestable clause
bars only defenses of invalidity and has no effect on defenses of no
coverage.
23
The provision that a policy shall be incontestable after it
has been in force during the lifetime of the insured for a
period of two years is not a mandate as to coverage, a
definition of the hazards to be borne by the insurer. It
means only this, that within the limits of the coverage the
policy shall stand, unaffected by any defense that it was
invalid in its inception, or thereafter became invalid by
reason of a condition broken.24
This limitation on the effect of the incontestable clause is based
on the belief that the legislature, in requiring an incontestable clause
in all life insurance policies, did not intend to nullify an insurer's
21. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Daniels, 125 Colo. 451, 244 P.2d 1064 (1952);
Werner v. State Life Ins. Co., 104 Ind. App. 27, 6 N.E.2d 786 (1937).
22. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 68 F. Supp. 83
(D. Del. 1946).
23. E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Shalloway, 151 F.2d 548 (5th
Cir. 1945) (the policy provided that misstatement of an applicant's age
would result in payments adjusted to his true age. The enforcement of
this provision did not contest the validity of the policy and thus was not
barred by the incontestable clause); Robison v. Brotherhood of R.R. Train-
mens Ins. Dep't, Inc., 73 Ariz. 352, 241 P.2d 791 (1952), modified on other
grounds, 74 Ariz. 44, 243 P.2d 472 (1952); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hol-
lender, 38 Cal. 2d 73, 237 P.2d 510 (1951) (the application of the age
adjustment clause of a policy raises only a question of coverage and is not
barred by the incontestable clause); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v.
Chapman, 106 Ga. App. 375, 127 S.E.2d 157 (1962); Carlson v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 76 Ill. App. 2d 187, 222 N.E.2d 363 (1966) (an incontestable
clause only prevents an insurer from contesting the validity of a policy at
its inception or thereafter by reason of a condition broken); Prudential Ins.
Co. of America v. Rice, 222 Ind. App. 231, 52 N.E.2d 624 (1944); O'Neil v.
Union Nat. Life Ins. Co., 162 Neb. 284, 75 N.W.2d 739 (1956); Mills v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 210 N.C. 439, 187 S.E. 581 (1936); Reed v.
Home State Life Ins. Co., 186 Okla. 226, 97 P.2d 53 (1939); Perilston v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 345 Pa. 604, 29 A.2d 487 (1943); Smith v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 169 Tenn. 477, 89 S.W.2d 165 (1936); Col-
lins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 163 Va. 833, 178 S.E. 40 (1935); Pacific
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Fishback, 171 Wash. 244, 17 P.2d 841 (1933).
24. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Conway, 252 N.Y. 449, 169 N.E.
642 (1930). A proposed rider for a life insurance policy excluding from
coverage the risk of death resulting from air travel except as a fare paying
passenger was held not inconsistent with the required incontestable
clause because a contest of no coverage is not barred.
right to contract. Rather, the intent was to prevent contests of
validity after the lapse of the contestable period. It did not intend
that a policy be issued that would, after the contestable period,
cover every conceivable risk other than those specifically excepted
in the statute.2 5  "The kind of insurance one has at the beginning,
but no more, one retains until the end. ' '20
Under this view it must be determined if a defense is based on
the validity of the policy or on no coverage under the policy. This
is a difficult distinction for the courts to make. It is made accord-
ing to the effect of a contest on the policy. When a contest con-
cerns validity, the whole contract is questioned, while a contest of
no coverage is an attempt to enforce the provisions of the con-
tract. 27 Thus, if an insurer successfully argues that a risk was not
covered, the policy remains in force as to the risks covered.
The results from the application of this distinction have
followed no real pattern. Three such results are offered to illus-
trate this divergence.
A policy provided that if the insured personally engaged in
service on a train the policy would be null and void. The insured
represented himself to be an attorney when in fact he was a rail-
road brakeman. He died while working on a train, and the insurer
denied liability on the grounds that such a risk was not covered by
the policy. The court held that this defense was barred by the
incontestable clause in the policy because the provision against
railroad employees was not an exclusion of a risk. The risk was
covered when the policy was issued, and the decedent merely vio-
lated a condition subsequent. To allege that a condition subse-
quent has been broken is a challenge to the validity of the policy.
The contract was voidable at its inception, and the insurer had the
contestable period in which to void the policy. 28
A group life insurance policy provided coverage to applicants
under the age of forty. Decedent misrepresented his age in his
application in order to qualify for coverage. The insurer was
25. Head v. New York Life Ins. Co., 43 F.2d 517 (10th Cir. 1930);
Flannagan v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 22 F.2d 136 (4th Cir.
1927); Field v. Western Indem. Co., 227 S.W. 530 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
26. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 252 N.Y. 449, 450, 169 N.E.
642, 643 (1930).
27. Rasmussen v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of U.S., 293 Mich.
482, 292 N.W. 377 (1940) (an incontestable clause will not bar an insurer
from showing either that the loss was not covered by the policy or that a
covered loss did not occur while the insurance was in force since the asser-
tion of these defenses is merely an enforcement of the policy provisions);
Livingston v. Mutual Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 173 S.C. 87, 174 S.E. 900 (1934)
(an incontestable clause does not prevent an insurer from canceling an
insurance policy for failure of the insured to comply with the terms of the
policy because the clause relates only to the validity of the policy and does
not affect the construction of its terms).
28. United Security Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Massey, 46 Ga. App. 1,
167 S.E. 247 (1933).
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allowed to contest its liability on the grounds that the decedent did
not satisfy a condition precedent to coverage under the policy.
29
A policy contained a provision that it would not become effec-
tive if the applicant consulted a physician after his application and
before receiving the policy. The insurer was allowed to contest its
liability on the grounds that the decedent violated this provision.
This was held to be a condition precedent to liability on the con-
tract. An incontestable clause bars only defenses based on nonful-
fillment of conditions precedent involving the existence of the con-
tract.3 0
The distinction between defenses involving the validity of the
policy and defenses alleging no coverage under the policy becomes
increasingly difficult to make when group policies are involved.
In Fisher v. United States Life Ins. Co.,"' the insurer was permitted
to deny liability on the policy because decedent, having misrepre-
sented himself to be an employee to qualify for coverage under the
policy, was not a risk covered by the policy. If this had been an
individual life insurance policy, the defense based on the misrepre-
sentation would surely have been barred by the incontestable clause
because such defense would be an attack on the validity of the
policy. 2 Even if the misrepresentation had been fraudulent, the
defense would be barred.3 Thus, the effect of an incontestable
clause on a defense of misrepresentation was nullified because
the insured was applying for a group life insurance policy.
Various arguments have been offered for the distinction be-
tween the effect of an incontestable clause in group life insurance
policies and its effect in individual policies. It is beneficial to the
public to enable employed groups to obtain the most advantageous
protection that their status warrants at the least cost by restricting
coverage to particular individuals.3 4 Also, an insurer deals directly
29. Rasmussen v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of U.S., 293 Mich.
492, 292 N.W. 377 (1940).
30. Hurt v. New York Life Ins. Co., 51 F.2d 936 (10th Cir. 1931).
31. Fisher v. United States Life Ins. Co., 249 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1957).
32. See, Great Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Russ, 14 F.2d 27 (8th Cir.
1926); Andrews v. Cosmopolitan Life, Health & Accident Ins. Co., 238
Mo. App. 1129, 194 S.W.2d 920 (1946); Gorski v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 88 Pa. Super. 326 (1926).
33. E.g., Commercial Life Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 50 Ind. App. 630,
97 N.E. 1018 (1912); Steigler v. Eureka Life Ins. Co., 146 Md. 629, 127 A.
397 (1925); Malnati v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 165 Misc. 417, 300 N.Y.S.
1313 (Sup. Ct. 1925), aff'd, 254 App. Div. 681, 3 N.Y.S.2d 211 (1938); Lud-
winska v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 115 Pa. Super. 228, 175 A. 283
(1934), rev'd on other grounds, 317 Pa. 577, 178 A. 28 (1935).
34. Rasmussen v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of U.S., 293 Mich.
482, 292 N.W. 377 (1940).
with the insured under an individual policy, but with a group policy
it deals only with the entity applying for the group insurance. An
insurer must therefore rely to a great extent on the represen-
tations of the employer as to the qualifications of his employees for
coverage.35
These arguments seem to contradict the legislative purpose
in requiring an incontestable clause in all group life insurance
policies. It appears from the wording of the New York statute 6
that the protection of the certificate holders3 from stale claims is
the primary purpose of the statute.38 It is equally obvious from
the existence of the statute that the legislature considered the pro-
tection of the certificate holders more important than the need to
maintain low group insurance rates.
An incontestable clause is merely a short statute of limi-
tations, 9 which still gives the insurer ample time to investigate and
contest the qualifications of the certificate holders. The legislature
must have realized the increased burdens this requirement would
place on insurers; but the existence of the requirement is evidence
that they considered the need for protection of the certificate hold-
ers to be of prime importance. It is difficult to understand why
the burden of investigating the qualifications of the certificate
holders would prove overburdensome. Group insurance has been
extremely profitable because the policies are sold on a mass basis
at negligible per capita sales cost a minimal administration cost
and a low rate of lapse.40 To afford a certificate holder of a group
life insurance policy protection equal to that given an insured un-
der an individual policy should not prove disastrous either to in-
surers or group insurance policies.
It has been argued that contesting a group life insurance policy
on the ground that the certificate holder does not qualify for the
insurance is in effect contesting the validity of the policy as to the
certificate holder. On its face a group policy provides such cover-
age of the certificate holder as is described in the policy. To raise
and rely on an extrinsic fact to contest this coverage is an attempt
to prove that the certificate holder is not as described in the
35. Simpson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 N.Y.S.2d 532 (Sup. Ct.
1968) (dissenting opinion).
36. See note 3 supra.
37. 1 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 46 (1965). The
employees covered by a group life insurance policy are in the position of
third party beneficiaries to the insurance contract. Their contractual rights
are evidenced both by the master policy issued to the employer and by the
certificate of insurance issued to each employee.
38. See note 4 supra.
39. E.g., Columbian Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Wallerstein, 91 F.2d 351
(7th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 755 (1937); Missouri State Life Ins. Co.
v. Cranford, 161 Ark. 602, 257 S.W. 66 (1924); Williamson v. American Ins.
Union, 284 Ill. App. 150, 1 N.E.2d 541 (1936); Darden v. North Am. Bene-
ficial Ass'n, 170 Va. 479, 197 S.E. 413 (1938).
40. 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 185 (1932).
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policy. 41 Such an argument is at least contesting the validity of
the application, and an application for insurance is considered to
be part of the insurance contract.
42
To allow an insurer to contest its liability on a group life insur-
ance policy on the grounds that the certificate holder did not qualify
for coverage would nullify the effect of the incontestable clause.
Any misrepresentation or fraud by the certificate holder in his
application could be raised at any time to contest liability on the
grounds that his true qualifications exclude him from the in-
tended coverage of the policy. Thus an insurer, by careful draft-
ing, could limit its coverage to such an extent as would render the
effect of the incontestable clause null. This would defeat the legis-
lative purpose behind the requirement of an incontestable clause in
all group life insurance policies.
48
Yet, an insurer should be allowed to contract for coverage of a
limited number of risks:
It seems illogical to us to say that a company will issue a
policy of insurance wherein it is expressly stated that it
will give certain benefits upon the happening of a clearly
defined future event, and to further say that because it
includes in the policy an agreement that after the policy
has been in effect a certain period of time it will not
contest the right to the benefits provided upon the grounds
of the invalidity of the contract that it thereby agrees to
deny itself the right to ask whether the clearly defined
future event has happened.
44
On the other hand, it would be improper to hold that an incon-
testable clause bars all defenses after the contestable period. A
reasonable solution would seem to be that an incontestable clause
in both individual and group life insurance policies should bar all
contests except those based on the defense that the hazard causing
death was not covered by the policy.45 If a policy specifies that
death by suicide is not a covered hazard, then a suicidal death
could be contested at anytime as a hazard not covered. Likewise,
a policy excluding a hazard which in fact causes the insured's
41. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dorman, 108 F.2d 220 (9th
Cir. 1940).
42. Leach v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 124 Kan. 584, 261 P. 603
(1927), reh. denied, 125 Kan. 129, 263 P. 784 (1928); Chrysler Corp. v. Hard-
wick, 299 Mich. 696, 1 N.W.2d 43 (1941); Thull v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y, 40 Ohio Op. 486, 178 N.E. 850 (Ct. App. 1931).
43. See note 38 supra.
44. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America v. Elias, 188 Okla. 408, 409,
109 P.2d 815, 817 (1941).
45. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dorman, 108 F.2d 220 (9th
Cir. 1940); Head v. New York Life Ins. Co., 43 F.2d 517 (10th Cir. 1930).
death would enable the insurer to contest its liability as to that
hazard at any time. Thus the distinction made in the majority of
jurisdictions between defenses of invalidity and defenses of cover-
age will be maintained. At the same time equal protection will be
afforded both the certificate holder and the insured under an indi-
vidual policy.
The true nature of an incontestable clause, that of a shorter
statute of limitations,46 will also be preserved. The only defenses
barred by an incontestable clause will be those based on grounds
which could have been discovered during the contestable period.
Therefore, if a group policy limits its coverage to union members,
and an insured who is not a union member dies after the contestable
period, the insurer can not contest liability on the grounds that
decedent was not covered. Non-membership in a union is not a
hazard which caused his death. The insurer could have discovered
the insured's lack of qualifications during the contestable period.
On the other hand, by contrast, those defenses which can only be
discovered after a claim to recover benefits has been made will be
allowed at any time. This distinction, while offering equal pro-
tection to all the insured public, would avoid the harshness of a
rule whereby all defenses except those specifically excepted would
be barred by the incontestable clause. No exceptions would be
needed for such atrocities, as when a beneficiary murders the in-
sured. Such a risk would not be covered by the policy.
There would be little difficulty applying this distinction and
thus the outcome of these cases would be more predictable. The
incontestable clause would bar all defenses directed toward con-
ditions precedent to the issuance of the policy, but not affect de-
fenses based on the enforcement of provisions and conditions that
necessarily relate to matters arising after the issuance of the pol-
icy.47  Of the three examples offered above 48 to illustrate the
difficulties of applying the Conway distinction, 49 the defenses al-
leged in the second and third examples would not be allowed since
they are directed toward conditions precedent to the issuance of the
policy. In the second example the applicant's age did not cause
his death, and the insurer could have discovered the misrepresen-
tation of his age during the contestable period. In the third ex-
ample, the applicant's consultation with a physician during the
prohibited period did not cause his death, and the insurer could
have discovered this violation of the policy provision during the
contestable period. The defense in the first example would be
allowed because it is based on the enforcement of a condition that
46. See note 39 supra.
47. Mayer v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 121 Pa. Super. 493,
184 A. 267 (1936).
48. See notes 26, 27 and 28 supra.
49. See note 23 supra.
Notes
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
necessarily relates to a matter arising after the issuance of the
policy. Here, the insurer had excluded from coverage the risk of
riding on a train. The insurer died as a result of engaging in
service on a train. This excluded risk was a hazard which caused
death. The insurer could have no knowledge that the excluded
hazard caused the insured's death until the death occurred. Thus
its liability could be contested after the contestable period.
SuvIPSON REVISITED
In Simpson the insurer attempted to contest its liability on
the grounds that the decedent did not qualify for coverage under
the terms of the group policy. The court, citing Eagon v. Union
Labor Life Ins. Co. 0 as controlling New York authority, properly
barred the defense after the contestable period. Eagon was brought
to recover benefits of a group life insurance policy providing cover-
age to union members. The decedent, who was never a member of
the union, was listed as a union member in the insurance applica-
tion. The insurer was barred by the incontestable clause from
contesting its liability on the ground that the decedent was never
covered by the policy. Eagon was twice affirmed with no major-
ity opinion; the reasons for its holding are unknown.
Simpson also decided that the insurer was trying to contest the
validity of the policy as to decedent. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Conway5' was cited with no comment as an example of a contest
directed solely toward no coverage. Conway held that a rider
which provided that death as a result of travel while in an aircraft,
except as a fare-paying passenger, was not a risk assumed and was
not barred by the incontestable clause in the policy. In Conway
the excepted risk was a hazard which could not be discovered and
contested before the issuance of the policy. But in Simpson the
decedent's qualification was a condition precedent to the issuance
of the policy which could be discovered and contested by the
insurer during the contestable period.
52
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dorman53 could have been
cited by Simpson to clarify the reasons for its decision. In Dorman
the insurer was barred by the incontestable clause from denying
liability because decedent was never an employee covered by the
50. See note 5 supra.
51. See note 24 supra.
52. Conway is often mis-cited as authority that an incontestable will
not bar a defense that the insured was not qualified for coverage under
the policy.
53. 108 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1940).
policy. In dictum the court said that only those defenses directed
toward no coverage of the hazard causing death are excepted from
the incontestable clause.
The Simpson result insures equal protection for beneficiaries
of all life insurance policies in that no defense barred by the incon-
testable clause of an individual policy will be excepted from the
incontestable clause of a group policy. By preventing the insurer
from raising this defense after the contestable period, the court
allowed the decedent the protection intended by the statutory re-
quirement of an incontestable clause in group life insurance pol-
icies.
ROBERT H. DUNLAP
